Two Philosophical Texts of Jerome of Prague and his Alleged Designation of Opponents of Real Universals as Diabolical Heretics

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A certain link between two texts of Jerome of Prague, the philosophical quaestio *Utrum veritas generalis sit signanda pro quacunque proposicione vera denominanda* (UVGS)¹ and *Utrum a parte rei universalia sit necessarium ponere pro mundi sensibilis harmonia* (UAPR)² is, among others, Jerome’s alleged designation of the opponents of his opinion on universals as diabolical heretics, based on the authority of St. Anselm and his treatise *De incarnatione verbi.*³ The object of this article is to present Jerome’s philosophical position on the basis of the two texts cited above, and to show that in the context of his life and in a discussion based on a study of the manuscripts that – as far as the “diabolical heretics” are concerned – it is probably just a matter of misunderstanding caused by a faulty reading of the manuscripts; a reading which has been widespread in other editions of texts of Bohemian provenance. We shall see that not only medieval Bohemian realists liked to appeal to St. Anselm’s authority but that a tradition of “the diabolical heretics” really could exist. We shall see further that Jerome’s philosophical position could have been influenced by his stay at Oxford for reasons beyond his study of John Wyclif’s writings.

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² The edition of *quaestio* UAPR was prepared by Jan Sedláč, *Studie a texty* 2 (1915) 215–224.

Jerome of Prague in Heidelberg

Our first text, the *quaestio* UVGS, is the earliest known work of Jerome of Prague. The text has been preserved in two manuscripts one in Basel the other in Paris. The latter dating from the eighteenth century, is an unreliable copy of the first one, containing many erroneous corrections.⁴ Jerome defended his standpoint in Heidelberg, where he was registered as *magister in artibus* on 7 April 1406,⁵ that is, after his studies in Paris and Cologne, the course of which had not been entirely serene.

Evidently Jerome had left Cologne in a hurry. Members of the university still had vivid memories of him almost twenty years later when, in their response of 24 December 1425, they resisted the Electors’ request to reject philosophical realism as such and reorient themselves toward the nominalist philosophical trends and “modern” masters, such as Buridan or Marsilius of Inghen and their followers.⁶ His departure from Paris had been equally hurried, since he wished to avoid an encounter with the University Chancellor and notorious “heresy-hunter” Jean Gerson⁷ and, subsequently, he would similarly escape from Vienna because of an impending trial on suspicion of heresy. It is evident that his stay in Heidelberg had not passed peacefully.

⁴ The manuscripts are MS Basel UB VIII A 24 ff. 45v–48r and MS Paris BN 1508 ff. 16v–20v. Neumann did not use the earlier and more reliable Basel manuscript for his edition. The Paris manuscript was copied in Basel around 1722–23 as a part of a team effort by copyists hired by the Basel theologian Jakob Christoph Iselin and by the secretary of the Royal Library, Abbé Jacques Nicolas Jourdain. The aim was to copy those documents of the Council of Basel that would tend to confirm the privileges of the Gallican Church. The team’s work extended from around 1716 to 1723 and the *quaestio* UVGS was among the documents that referred to the Council of Constance which were the last copied, hence the dating given above. As noted earlier, the Paris copy often contains errors of interpretation despite the efforts of a reviser to make corrections both in the text and in the margins. See Zénon Kaluža, “La question de Jérôme de Prague,” 126–127.
This can be seen from the records of Heidelberg University;[^8] from the text of the *quaestio* UVGS; from the acts of the Council of Constance;[^9] and from the protocols of the Vienna trial[^10] which also included testimonies about Jerome’s activity in Heidelberg. According to the last document, Nicholas Tell and, less explicitly, Conrad of Hildesheim testified that Jerome had already used his term “diabolical heretics” with regard to the earlier mentioned masters Marsilius of Inghen and Buridan, as well as William Ockham, Johann of Maulfeld, and their followers.[^11]

The turbulence of his stay in Heidelberg is documented by another source, which up to now has apparently escaped critical notice. This source has been preserved only as a fragment which, in the Basel manuscript, follows immediately after Jerome’s *quaestio* UVGS where it ends mid-sentence. It is an accusatory speech against Jerome by Johann Lagenator of Frankfurt, a prominent master of Heidelberg University and later an anti Hussite inquisitor, who held the highest ranking academic positions during his teaching at the University.[^12]

[^8]: See n. 5 above.
[^9]: See Hardt IV, columns 645, 646, and 681
[^12]: Johann Lagenator of Frankfurt came from Dieburg near Frankfurt and arrived at Heidelberg before 1401 already with a master’s degree from the Faculty of Arts in Paris, which he obtained in 1396. He became Bachelor of Theology in 1404, and Professor of Theology in 1416. At the University of Heidelberg he served three times as Rector (in 1406, 1416, and 1428/29), as Vice-Chancellor (1421–1431, 1433–1434), *consiliarius* at the court of King Ruprecht I and at the court of his son Ludwig III, Count Palatine (whom he also served as chaplain and confessor) and, since 1425, he acted as an inquisitor against the Bohemian Reformers. He died highly honoured in Heidelberg on 13 May 1440. See Dorothea Walz, “Einleitung,” in Johannes von Frankfurt, *Zwölf Werke des Heidelberger Theologen und Inquisitor* (Heidelberg, 2000) ix, as well as Hermann Heimpel, *Drei Inquisitionsverfahren aus dem Jahre 1425* (Göttingen, 1969) 148–150; Rudolf Haubst, “Johann von Frankfurt,” in *Verfasserlexikon* (Berlin and New York, 1983) 4:599–603; and Marie Luise Bulst-Thiele, “Johannes von Frankfurt (+ 1440). Professor der Theologie an der Universität Heidelberg, Rat des Pfalzgrafen und Kurfürsten Ludwig III,” in *Semper apertus. Sechshundert Jahre Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg 1386–1986* (Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, and Tokyo, 1985) 1:136–161. Josef Třiška has assumed that it was the same Johann of Frankfurt who had studied in Prague as a Bachelor in 1397 (MUPR I–1, p. 327). See Josef Třiška, *Rétorický styl a pražská univerzitní literatura ve středověku* [The Rhetorical Style and Prague University Literature in the Middle Ages] (Prague, 1975) 76. In that case, he would have encountered Jerome earlier in Prague. It is more likely that the Prague student was a namesake of Lagenator, since the latter had been already a master of liberal arts in Paris a year earlier. See František Šmahel, “Univerzitní kvestie a polemiky mistra Jeronýma Pražského” [University Quaestiae and Polemics of Master Jerome of Prague] AUC-HUCP XXII/2 (1982) 9 or an updated English version in František Šmahel, ed., *Die Prager Universitatis Im Mittelalter: The Charles University in the Middle Ages* (Leiden and Boston, 2007) 541 n9.
It certainly is not accidental that this savant chose as the basic theme of his oration a passage from Colossians (2:8), and warned his audience not to be seduced by empty and false philosophising. Subsequently, he continues with a statement that God also wishes us to be educated by pagan writings and thus he may be touching on Jerome’s standpoint, in the record of which several times we actually find references to such writings. The traditional triple division of history into the time of natural law, the law of Moses, and the law of the Gospel, however, clearly indicates, according to Lagenator, that later scholars always declared something better, or wrote more outstanding philosophical books. It was only in the state of light and charity, when the sun of truth was created, that the later doctors examined the obscure speculation and opinions of the pagan writings and, thus, they could reach their innermost crux. Thereby, according to Lagenator, orthodoxy is affirmed and protected against the clever deceits of the heretics by the most learned and perspicacious men. The latter watch by day and night in the vineyard of the Lord of Hosts to keep the enemy from coming and blocking the way by the thorns of false teaching or pagan tradition or by opinions which are more curious than fruitful, through which many people are snared so that, by negligence, they are more puzzled by better and more profitable opinions instead of accepting them as true, considering them more odd than correct. Further on, Jerome is indirectly designated as a crazy, mischievous, and reprehensible perverter of the ancient wisdom of the Greeks. Moreover, Jerome is said to have done this by misusing the fathers and masters, both living and dead, whose teaching had adorned the holy Church; thereupon a citation is offered from the Book of Wisdom, and then another one from Exodus, and the entire context seems to suggest that our Jerome was an unscrupulous manipulator.

The scolding reaction to Jerome’s presentation in Heidelberg evidently occurred after a disputation lasting several days, when “the faculty no longer wished to listen and sent a master to deliver a response,” who may just have been Johann of Frankfurt. This master stresses the kindness of Jerome’s reception in Heidelberg, and the rancor that he had sown there. The situation culminated by Jerome’s suspension by the Faculty of Arts from all academic acts. Not even this prohibition, however, could keep the Master from Prague from responding

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13 “Videte, ne quis vos decipiat per phylosophiam et inanem fallaciam!” See the critical edition of the fragment of his oration in Angelika Häse, “Johannis de Franckfordia. Videte, ne quis vos decipiat. Angriffsrede gegen die Quaestio Utrum veritas generalis sit significanda des Hieronymus von Prag (1406),” in Dorothea von Walz ed., Johannes von Frankfurt, Zwölf Werke des Heidelberger Theologen und Inquisitors (Heidelberg, 2000) 99–100. For the sake of clarity let us note that Jerome of Prague probably never officially studied at any faculty of theology, despite the fact that he had received four master’s degrees in arts by the end of his life and had treated theological subjects in his writings.

14 See the edition of the oration, ibid.

to opposing views. We have reports that the next day he went to make his further response in the cemetery of St. Peter’s Church, where his audience consisted only of rural folk and old women,\textsuperscript{17} since the Rector’s office had prohibited students to listen to his lectures.\textsuperscript{18} About this time, Jerome was also accused before the Bishop of Worms – Mathew of Cracow – of holding four heretical or offensive articles, and it can be assumed that he was leaving Heidelberg.\textsuperscript{19} In addition, shortly thereafter – because of Jerome’s affair in Heidelberg – the statutes of the Faculty of Arts were changed. Henceforth every master or bachelor of another university, who wished to be admitted to the Faculty of Arts, had to swear that he would not determine any other questio \textit{in cathedra} other than that which he had submitted to the Dean – \textit{de verbo ad verbum} prior to the determination – for “diligent examination of its pertinence for the Faculty of Arts.”\textsuperscript{20}

**Heidelberg Quaestio UVGS**

Let us now direct our attention to the standpoint of the alleged “perverter of the ancient wisdom of the Greeks,” which aroused in Heidelberg so much indignation and offended “the most splendid fathers and masters, both dead and alive, whose teaching had adorned the holy church.” In examining the \textit{quaestio} UVGS let us first present Jerome’s individual conclusions and their corollaries, and subsequently point out some doctrinal aspects of each.

First of all, however, it is necessary to point out that the \textit{quaestio} UVGS is a clearly arranged, structured text,\textsuperscript{21} which is divided into two articles, which

\textsuperscript{17} “…iuxta intimatum ivit ad cimeterium S. Petri, ubi invenit rusticos et vetulas tantum, quia studentibus omnibus per juramentum suo actui interesse fuit interdictum,” Hautz, \textit{Geschichte der Universität Heidelberg}, 232.

\textsuperscript{18} “…inhibitum fuit ex officio rectoratus, ne quis de cetero eum audiat in replicationibus as leccionibus vel disputacionibus,” Miethke, ed., \textit{Die Rektorbücher der Universität Heidelberg}, 414 no. 427; see also Hautz, \textit{Geschichte der Universität Heidelberg}, 232.

\textsuperscript{19} See Klicman, \textit{Processus iudiciarius contra Jeronimum de Praga}, 12.

\textsuperscript{20} Our attention is called to this by the scribe in the protocols of the Faculty of Arts who, on this occasion, on f. 28r introduced a new sign in the form of a triangle with an inserted point and refers to the ordinance concerning Jerome’s stay: “Propterque et ad simile periculum in futurum evitandum, facultas sane consulta statuit unum statutum quo octavo folio circa principium libri signo tali.” On f. 8r Jerome is actually twice mentioned as a heretic and we also find here the noted order concerning censorship by the then Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Ysebrandus de Wyringia. See Acta Fac. Art. T.I. (MS Heidelberg UA H IV 101/1) f. 28r and ibid., f. 8r. For the Dean’s order, see Eduard Winkelmann, ed., \textit{Urkundenbuch der Universität Heidelberg} (Heidelberg, 1886) 1:44 l. 1–10.

\textsuperscript{21} On the structure of the quaestiones of Prague provenance see, for instance, Vilém Herold, \textit{Pražská univerzita a Wyclif} [The Prague University and Wyclif] (Prague, 1985) 177–180; concerning its possible utilisation, see also Ota Pavlíček, “Jak je dnes možné zabývat se pražskými kvestiemi a jak si pomoci při přemýšlení nad jejich filosofickým obsahem?” [How can one nowadays deal with the Prague quaestiae, and what can aid in the analysis of their philosophical contents?] \textit{Aither} 2 (2009) 223–230.
together include six conclusions subsuming altogether eighteen numbered corollaries and a concluding “corrolarium ultimum.” In addition, all of these enumerated parts can be treated more or less independently and in detail. At the same time, it is necessary to point out that the extant record represents only the structure of the proposition and that its actual form was much more extensive and elaborate, probably mostly as far as the cited authorities were concerned. Moreover, the text is corrupt in several places. The entire first article Jerome devoted to the ideas and their relation to God and the created beings; then the second article to the metaphysical relations among the created beings and to the importance of these beings for logical relations. Considering that in this quæstio Jerome presented such a wide spectrum of his thoughts, it is not difficult to understand, why the Heidelberg disputation lasted such a long time.

The First Article

Jerome begins his presentation with the assertion that dating the ideal truths to the creation of the world is to contradict the Christian faith because – supported by the authority of St. Augustine – the ideas are separate, eternal, and true. To maintain that these eternal ideas exist, according to Jerome, contradicts Christian faith and philosophy, because to maintain that ideas exist means, in fact, to assert that they begin with creation, because to begin means to be ad extra in the created world, which cannot be admitted about the ideas. Consequently, according to Jerome, the conclusion is true. In the following first corollary, our Master first of all stresses that the ideas are separated from the created beings. He points out that any created thing exists through the mediation of an idea as its example (exemplar), and it is, therefore, necessary for the example to be separate from the thing to which it serves as the example, to the exemplatum. At the same time he denies that any exemplatum could preexist its example, and it was thus necessary for

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22 As mentioned above in n. 1, it was necessary to correct the text of the quæstio from the early edition. As also noted these changes were adopted – except for a few – from Kaluža’s study. I have compared with the manuscript and corrected those passages which Kaluža does not mention. As Kaluža has also pointed out, even the text of the Basel manuscript requires a number of corrections and reconstructions. See Kaluža, “La question de Jérôme de Prague ...,” 122–152. Likewise Neumann’s edition is for a variety of reasons unreliable. Hence my references to the quæstio UVGS are to the given passages in MS Basel UB VIII A 24.

23 Ponere ydeales veritates <per creacionem incipere = existere> est directe fidei christianæ contradicere. Probatur, quia ydee sunt separate, eterne, veridice, ut ex Augustini verbis atque sensu ostensum est. Sed ea que eterna sunt ponere per creacionem incipere est directe fidei christianæ contradicere <et> philosophie; et quia ponere ideas existere est ponere eas per creacionem incipere, cum ['incipere' sit ad extra in universitate creatæ sistere, quod veritati–bus idealibus nequit competere, sequitur dictis conclusionis fore verum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 45v).
the ideas, as the most eminent models, to precede their exemplata.\textsuperscript{24} In the second corollary, Jerome once more appeals to Augustine, this time to his view that – although Plato first coined the term “idea” – the idea as such is still eternal because what lacks a generally recognized name can be given any name.\textsuperscript{25}

In this way, the first conclusion of the \textit{quaestio} UVGS and its corollaries introduce us into the intellectual world of John Wyclif’s Bohemian and other followers. In the first passage, Jerome presents a definition of the concept “to exist” as “to begin at the creation” or “to be ‘ad extra’ in the created world” which, he maintains, entitles him to reject the possibility of designating the manner of the ideas’ being as “esse existere”. Hence, in the first conclusion of the \textit{quaestio} UVGS, Jerome denies “the existence” of ideas, but only as to their being in the created world, which he does in agreement with the doctrine of Wyclif and his disciples about the triple being – \textit{esse intelligibile, esse posse, and esse existere}.\textsuperscript{26} Next, Jerome argues that the “dissociation” of ideas means a separation from their exemplata, that is, the created things, which are preceded by ideas (as their examples), while every exemplatum has its being through the mediation of an idea. As we shall see in the discussion of the first conclusion of the second article of the \textit{quaestio} UVGS, Jerome considers as created things both universals and particulars, and it is, therefore, likely that in his philosophical system every individual thing has a corresponding idea. This is also supported by the statement in his \textit{quaestio} Utrum mundus archetypus, qui est multitudo idearum in mente divina ... (UMAQ).\textsuperscript{27} In the Bohemian intellectual tradition, in any case, Jerome was not the first to maintain that particulars had their own ideas. Such a view was previously entertained by Stanislav of Znojmo – in his day the outstanding figure among the Prague realists.\textsuperscript{28} Subsequently, in the second corollary, Jerome again brings up the question of the eternity of ideas, which he supports with a citation

\textsuperscript{24} Licet idee separate non existant, ipse tamen veridice separate sunt. Probatur, quia iuxta dicta quelibet res creata habet esse per ideam tanquam per suum exemplar, sed necesse est exemplar separatum esse a suo exemplato, et negandum hoc, scilicet exemplatum precedere <exemplar>. Igitur ideas tamquam exemplaria certissima necesse est [exempla] exemplata precedere, quod erat probandum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 45v).

\textsuperscript{25} Quamvis Plato nomen ydee primo invenierit, ipsa tamen res cum Platonis sentencia est eter‑ na. Prima pars patet per Augustinum in libro 83 questionum, ut extitit superius allegatum: Nam licet unicuique rei, nondum nomen habenti usitatam, quodlibet nomen imponere. Secunda pars patet ex probacione conclusionis prime, igitur corollarium verum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 45v).

\textsuperscript{26} Almost all the literature which deals with Wyclif’s philosophical system touches Wyc‑ liff’s “triple being”. See, for instance, Alessandro D. Conti, “Wyclif’s Logic and Methaphysics,” in Ian C. Levy ed., \textit{A Companion to John Wyclif} (Leiden, 2006) 93–94 who points out that in Wyclif’s system there also exists a fourth level of being – the accidental being.

\textsuperscript{27} See UMAQ II. articulus, 2. conclusion, 1. corollary. With his kind permission, I am using for comparison Vilém Herold’s transcription of \textit{quaestio} UMAQ.

\textsuperscript{28} Stanislav of Znojmo holds this proposition in the first chapter of his large treatise \textit{De Universalibus}. See Michael H. Dziewicki, \textit{Miscellanea Philosophica} 1 (London, 1902) 1–5.
from Augustine. The latter refers to Plato, and Jerome will appeal to him later in the text.

In the second conclusion, Jerome turns his attention to the concept of the first cause, and maintains that, to designate everything that exists (that is, is created) as the first cause, means violating the true order. That is to say, if the first cause would be anything, then anything would be the first cause, and thus there would be as many first causes, as there were things. Consequently, in the first corollary, the first cause is then identified as God, in whose being there are causes of all things. These causes are “entities called ideas,” which are essentially identical with the first cause, but formally are distinct from it. They are uncreated and proportionately correspond to all things that are created or creatable. In the second corollary, according to Jerome, the ideas are also uncreated, but they do not subsist by themselves, because – except for God – nothing can be its own substance, and ideas are formally distinct from God. The third corollary, to the contrary, emphasises the essential unity of God and the ideas, when Jerome maintains that they are neither substances nor accidents, yet they are essentially supersubstantialis substantia. The first part of the third corollary is valid, according to Jerome, because ideas precede the entire creation and thus are not apprehensible by categories. The second part is valid, because whatever is essentially in God is God, who – according to Dionysius – is a “supersubstantial substance,” hence a substance above the category of substance, and anything of this kind is eternal and eternally entrenched in God.

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29 Dicere causam primam quodlibet existere, est ordinem veridicum vel veritatum confundere. Probatur, nam si per adversarios prima causa esset quodlibet, tunc quodlibet esset prima causa et sic tot prime cause essent, quot res essent, quod est error in philosophia, cum in causis essencialiter subordinatis sit devenire ad primam <causam> (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 45v).

30 Quamvis Deus sive prima causa non existit quodlibet, habet tamen ab esse in se esse causati cuiuslibet. Probatur ex dictis, nam veritas, ydee cognominate, sunt essencialiter <ipsa causa prima, sed formaliter> non <sunt> eadem prima <causa>. Que quidem veritates sunt <proporcionate> entitat<e>s incréate omnium rerum ad extra facturarum sive factibilium, igitur corolariam verum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, ff. 45v–46r).

31 Quamvis veritates ideales neque facte neque [in]create sunt, ipse tamen nequaquam in se ipsis subsistunt. Probatur corolarium pro utraque parte. Nam, quod eternum est, nec est factum, nec creatum, sed tales veritates eterne sunt ex iam dictis, igitur etc. Corolariam pro prima parte verum. Sed secunda pars corollarii, scilicet, quod nequaquam in se ipsis subsistunt, patet, quia nihil preter Deum est sibimet substantia. Sed veritates huiusmodi non sunt formaliter Deus, igitur corolariam verum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 46r).

32 Quamvis veritates eternae nec sunt substantie, nec accidencia, quelibet tamen ipsarn est essencialiter supersubstancialis substantia. <Prima> pars corolari patet, quia omne esse creatum antecedunt, et per consequens esse cathegoriarum omnium, et per consequens substantie predicamentalis atque cuiusvis generalissime accidentis. Et secunda pars patet, quia quelibet veritas huiusmodi est essencialiter Deus, cum iuxta theologos quidquid est in Deo est Deus, qui, iuxta Dyonisium, est supersubstancialis substantia, quia substantia super predicamentalem substantiam, et cum quelibet huiusmodi sit eterna atque in Deo eterna fundata, patet plane, quod sequitur (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 46r).
to Plato, and maintains that in creating the world God followed a glorious norm, which was the venerable model – the archetypal world. Finally, in the last corollary of the second conclusion (thereby the last item of the entire article) Jerome is again concerned with the proportionality between the creatable and created truths on the one side, and the eternal truths on the other. He asserts that in view of the diversity among the created or creatable truths, which are exemplarily created from the uncreated truths, a proportional diversity prevails also among these eternal truths.

It is evident that the entire second conclusion with its corollaries is but a development of the first conclusion. Although it is first concerned with God, it soon returns to the question of ideas and to the character of their inherence in the First Cause. It is apropos to recall that Jerome first treats the question of the ideas and he is concerned with God only in the second conclusion, which indicates the importance, which he ascribes to the ideas, an importance which already was appropriately shown in the connection with the entire wycliffite circle in Prague. This order of preference is also explicable by the fact that Jerome sought a philosophical – not a theological – understanding, and we can assume that ideas – not only in quaestio UVGS – interested him particularly for their causal function in conjuring up beings perceptible by the senses. This is also confirmed by the second article of Jerome’s quaestio UMAQ, for instance, by its second conclusion, according to which ideas are co-causes of the sensible world (concause rerum mundi sensibilis).

The second conclusion of quaestio UVGS and its corollaries subordinate, to the First Cause, the essentially weaker causes and thus also ideas which are formally distinct, but essentially are identical with First Cause. Thus Jerome’s argumentation posits a virtually insurmountable obstacle to a claim

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33 Omnes veritates create sunt a veritatibus increatis exemplate. Patet illud corrolarium ex iam dictis et per illud Platonicum: <Liquet opificem> Deum <in> constituto isto mundo sensibili venerabilis exempli, id est mundi architipi, preclaram normam secutum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 46r).

34 Omnum veritatum ad extra factarum sive factibilium est proporcionata diversitas eter‑ narum veritatum. Probatur corrolarium, nam ex premissis omnes veritates create exemplariter a veritatibus increatis, sed talium est proportionaliter diversitas, igitur et eum exemplarium (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 46r).


36 Jerome was to deal with a similar subject in 1411 at the quodlibet of Jan Hus who assigned him the questio Utrum omne dependens sit ens per participacionem prime cause. Jerome’s version, however, is not extant. See Jan Hus, Quodlibet, ed. Bohumil Ryba (Turnhout, 2006) 150–151.
that he embraced ideas separated from God’s mind, because, for him, a formal distinction most likely corresponds to a distinction by reason only, and hence an essential identity is superordinate to the formal distinction.

This conclusion is supported by the further sequence of Jerome’s approach. According to his view, what is essentially God is eternal, hence uncreated, and antecedent to any kind of categorical determination. Ideas, which correspond to this definition, are not God just “formally.” They must, therefore, be identical with God, yet at the same time distinct from him. Jerome explains this by their necessary inherence in the “supersubstantial substance,” and precisely by the formal distinction. Ideas are thus eternally and essential embedded in God, whereby consequently it is made possible for them to be formally distinct from God.

According to Alain de Libera, Jerome was designated by Ioannes de Nova Domo as an authentic partisan of Platonic Ideas understood as separate universals existing in re extra Deum, “hors des singuliers et hors de l’intellect divin” and the same medieval author places Jerome among the so-called formalizantes. See Alain de Libera, La philosophie médiévale (Paris, 1993) 477. Although it may have seemed to his contemporaries, including Jean Gerson, that Jerome shared certain errors of the formalizantes, he never abandoned the basic philosophical framework of Wyclif and did not belong among the formalizantes. It is evident that Gerson and Ioannes de Nova Domo inappropriately simplified Jerome’s doctrines in their zeal against “Platonism,” and it is important to recall that particularly Gerson was above all concerned about the theological consequences of Jerome’s philosophy. See Kaluža, “Le chancelier Gerson,” 105 and Zénon Kaluža, “Le « De universali reali » de Jean de Maisonneuve et les epicuri litterales,” Die Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 33 (1986) 483–485, Vilém Herold, “Der Streit zwischen Hieronymus von Prag und Johann Gerson,” 77–89 and Marc Vial, Jean Gerson : théoricien de la théologie mystique (Paris, 2006) 123. Moreover, in his extant writings, Jerome always inserts ideas into God’s mind and, for him, this does not involve any kind of violation of the absolute singleness of the divine essence; see Kaluža, “La question de Jérôme de Prague,” 145.

Inasmuch as Jerome never defines the concept of “formal distinction,” we can only presume that under this term he meant the same distinction as Wyclif. It is likewise possible that he adopted the term from a follower of Wyclif or that he invented his own concept. Wyclif borrowed the concept from Duns Scotus and his own definition was apparently a compromise between the two definitions of Scotus. See Alessandro D. Conti, “Wyclif’s Logic and Metaphysics,” 72–78, and idem, “Categories and Universals in the Later Middle Ages,” in Lloyd A. Newton ed., Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories (Leiden, 2008) 395–396. It does not, therefore, mean either that this concept necessarily corresponded to that of Scotus or that Jerome adopted the formal distinction in the sense of Scotus or Wyclif, even though he was probably closest to Wyclif. Among the contemporary Bohemian realists Stanislav of Znojmo produced the most detailed treatise about distinctions in his De Universalibus. He considers the formal distinction the least of the distinctions and equates it with a distinction of reason. To understand in detail how the Bohemian Wyclifite philosophers did or did not modify the concept of formal distinction, it would be necessary to examine a hitherto unpublished text which focused specifically on this issue. For Jerome, as well as other earlier mentioned thinkers, the concept of formal distinction surely served the purpose of distinguishing the internal aspects of a given thing. On possible relations between Duns Scotus and the Prague Wyclifites as well as for references to the relevant passages in Stanislav of Znojmo see also Stanislav Sousedík, “Pojem „distinctio formalis“ u českých realistů v době Husově” [The Concept distinctio formalis among Bohemian Realists in the Time of Hus] FČ 18 (1970) 1024–1029.
Further in the text, we see Jerome’s stress on the correspondence between the world of ideas (*mundus archetypus*) and the world perceptible by the senses, with the former serving as a model for the latter. We also ascertain that, as early as his stay in Heidelberg, Jerome was familiar with at least a fragment of Calcidius’ translation of Plato’s *Timaeus*, which he subsequently cites to a substantially greater extent in his *quaestio* UAPR, discussed below. Finally, the last partial conclusion is evidently an allusion to the *quaestio De Ideis* of St. Augustine about the necessary diversity of ideas, that is, the argument about the impossibility of creating both an ass and a man according to the same model. This argument Jerome flaunts together with other Prague masters. 39

The Second Article

Jerome opens the second article with a conclusion that maintaining that the universal created truths are separate from particulars is not only a logical error, but also a philosophical one. It is illogical, because thereby God could destroy a genus and at the same time preserve the subordinate species, or destroy the species and preserve the subordinate particular; thus a species would exist without the genus, and a particular without the species. Jerome considers this a contradiction in terms, and hence to maintain that, a universal truth of genus exists separated from the particular, is a logical error. It is also a philosophical error, if one maintains that something can be without its inner principles. Whoever says that a species, i.e., the truth of a species, can be without the truth of the genus (the genus or the being of a genus) asserts, according to Jerome, that a created thing can exist without its inner principle, and thus errs not only logically, but also philosophically. 40 Jerome adds in the first corollary that, even if the genus is not separated from the species and the species from the particular or vice versa, it is still necessary to formally distinguish the genus from the species, and the species from the particular. His explanation is that, whatever is essentially and internally required for the being of something other, must be recognized as something distinct from the other. This is precisely the relationship of the being of the genus to that

39 See Jerome’s argument, for instance, in *quaestio* UAPR, 218.
40 Firmiter assedere veritates universales esse creatas a singularibus separatas est error nedum logicus sed et physiologicus. Probatur hec conclusio, <et primo quod sit error logicus>. Nam <ponendo> quaecunque universalia separatà <a singularibus> existere, Deus potest corrumpere unum, conservandum reliquum in esse suo perfecto, iuxta articulum Parisiensem; sed contradictionem implicat speciem esse sine genere aut individuum sine specie, igitur ponere veritatem universalem specificam a singuli existere separatam est error artis loyce. Et quod sit error physiologicus probatur sic. Dicere aliquid posse esse sine suis principiis intrinseci est error physiologicus; sed quicunque dicit speciem, id est veritatem specificam, posse esse sine generali veritate, que genus est siue esse generis, dicit rem creatam posse esse sine suo intrinseco principio. Igitur nedum errat loyce, sed et physiophisce, igitur conclusio vera (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, ff. 46r—46v).
of the species, and of the being of the species to that of the particular.\footnote{Licet non sit dare genus separatum a specie aut speciem ab individuo, aut retrorsum exister, verumtamen necesse est genus a specie et speciem ab individuo formaliter distinguere. Probatur, quia quodcumque requiritur ad esse alterius essencialiter atque intrinsece, illud ponere distinctum ab altero est necesse; sed sic se habet esse generis ad speciem et species (= esse speciei) ad individuum, igitur corrolarium verum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 46v).} The following second corollary states that, although the universal is essentially its particular, it is formally distinct from its particular. To demonstrate this, Jerome points out that the human species or a universal man is essentially a mortal reasoning animal and, at the same time, this characteristics is valid for all individual men. According to Jerome, it is evident that the particular is formally distinct from the universal, because the universal man is the what-ness of all the particular human beings, without which no particular can be a man. Moreover, while man as a species can be shared by many, a particular one cannot be shared so.\footnote{Quamvis universale sit suum singulare essencialiter, differt tamen ab eo formaliter. Probatur, nam species humana, sive homo in communi, quod idem est, est essencialiter animal racionale mortale, et hoc idem est quilibet homo singularis, igitur prima pars corrolarii vera. Et secunda pars, scilicet quod differt ab eo formaliter, patet, nam homo communis est quid-ditates omnium hominum singularium, sine qua nemo singularis potest esse homo; eciam homo in specie est communicabilis multis, singularis vero nequaquam, ergo corrolarium verum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 46v).} The first conclusion of the second article thus gives us a chance to see Jerome’s standpoint on the matter of created universals and their relationship to the particulars, as well as to the truth. From the viewpoint of his realism, the important question about the setting of the created universals is solved by their essential identity with the particulars. According to him, the universals are not separated from the particulars; they are essentially present in the particulars, and differ from the particulars just formally, which is in principle the same distinction, which we have discussed earlier. Let us add that the use of the formal distinction is another sign that his thinking is grounded in Wyclif, because this distinction – albeit with possible modifications – was common to all of Wyclif’s followers, and Jerome, by its use, placed himself to some extent among them.\footnote{On the Oxford realists and their doctrines, as well as their common characteristics and differences, see Alessandro D. Conti, “Studio storico-critico,” in Alessandro D. Conti ed., Johannes Sharpe, Quaestio super universalia (Florence, 1990) 211–238, 295–336; and idem, “Categories and universals in the Later Middle Ages,” 397–405.} In this section, Jerome also stresses as important the hierarchy of the internal principles. Thus every subordinate level requires for its existence a superordinate one as its internal principle and, properly speaking, also its cause, which establish in it the necessity of a formal distinction. Finally, the last aspect of the created universals – their contiguity with the truth – already ushers in the second conclusion of the second article, where Jerome’s focus shifts to the field of logic.\footnote{We shall deal with this issue concisely; for a more detailed treatment, see Zénon Kaluža, “La question de Jérôme de Prague,” 135–136, 147–152.}
Jerome’s second conclusion states that, just as the genus precedes the species, so also the truth of the genus does the truth of the species. The being of the genus is the internal cause of its species, without which the species cannot be, and the same relationship prevails between the truth of the genus, and the truth of the species.\(^45\) The truth of “the real propositions” thus, according to the first corollary, does not rest in the coherence of signs, but in the drawing together of its proper and primary significata (\textit{habitudine suorum proprie primarie significatorum}). Therefore, prior to the being of these signs, it has “the complete being” of its \textit{principia} and \textit{principiatoria}, on which it rests. Thus, according to Jerome, the truth of the real proposition is the mutual drawing together of the real subject and the real predicate.\(^46\) Jerome’s next corollary states that no designation of things is based on the designation of signs, because the denomination of a thing is derived from the essential, that is, internal principles. Inasmuch as every sign of a thing is external (because it appears after “the complete being”), none can truly or really denominate any thing.\(^47\)

In this part of the quaeestio Jerome significantly gravitates to the realistic logic, whereby he links not only with Wyclif and his followers, but also with his precursors.\(^48\) As noted, according to Jerome, the truth of the real proposition is the mutual drawing together of the real subject and the real predicate, which represents “the complete being.” It is a drawing together of the proper and initial significata of the real proposition (\textit{habitudine suorum proprie primarie significatorum}), and it seems that according to Jerome, the real subject and the real predicate correspond to the principle (predicate) and the thing derived from the principle (subject) in the real world. This would fittingly correspond to Jerome’s earlier-mentioned idea of a more universal, which is essentially and internally the principle of the less universal, without which the less universal cannot exist. Considering that the drawing together of the

\(^{45}\) Sicut via nature genus antecedit speciem, sic veritas generalis specialem veritatem. Probatur, quia esse genus est causa intrinseca sue speciei necessario ad eandem requisita, sed veritas generalis sic se habet respectu veritatis specifice, igitur conclusio vera (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 46v).

\(^{46}\) Veritas proposicionum realium non consistit in coherencia signorum, sed in habitudine suo<rum> proprie primarie significatorum. Prima pars huius corollarii patet, <nam> veritas proposicionum realium est ante esse <sui> signi huiusmodi, igitur habet esse completum ante esse sui signi huiusmodi, igitur habet esse completum principiorum principiatorumque <in quo> consistit. Que <quidem veritas> est habitudo mutua realsi subiecti ad reale predicatum [principium ms.], igitur corollarium verum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 46v).

\(^{47}\) Nulla denominacio rerum fundatur in denominacione signorum. Probatur sic, quia una denominacio rerum est resultans ex essencialibus atque intrinsecis principiis; sed cum omne signum [non] extrinsecum est rei cum sibi post completum esse adveniet, igitur nullum tale vere atque realiter aliquam rem denominat. Igitur corollarium verum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 46v).

\(^{48}\) On the practitioners of realist logic, see especially Laurent Cesalli, \textit{Le réalisme propositionnel} (Paris, 2007) and other works of the same author. See also n. 43 above.
real subject and the real predicate is represented in Jerome’s philosophical system, for instance, by every existing particular, then the truth rests in this really existing particular, and a real proposition is then, for instance, a really existing concrete man, who precedes his own denomination on the basis of signs. The signs are vis à vis “his truth” externally and do not denominate really and truthfully any thing. This line of reasoning is undoubtedly an allusion to the nominalistic trends, abounding in Heidelberg, and represented by the so-called “doctores signorum”. Jerome’s implicit and explicit critique of them will be endemic in the remainder of our discussion and, above all, it will lead us to Jerome’s answer to the question, which he was pursuing in Heidelberg.

The following third conclusion includes three corollaries that further develop what has been just discussed. According to Jerome, every external denomination of a proposition necessarily requires a denomination inseparably consequent to its inner nature, because every essential being presupposes its effect as its internal principle, which cannot be separated from its effect because it is itself the effect. Because it is subsequent to the thing, the external being can be secundum esse intellectum separated from the thing, whereby every separable being is based on an inseparable being, just as the external being is based on the internal being. The external denomination, however, is a later matter and, therefore, according to Jerome, it is evident that it requires a prior real internal denomination. The second corollary adds an example: As a painted image of a man relates to the actual man, so a proposition according to the sign relates to the real proposition, because a proposition according to the sign is a separable accident, and analogously the sign relates to the signification of the real proposition. The third corollary further adds

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50 Ante omnem denominacionem proposicionis extrinsecam necessarie primo requiritur denomination inseparabiliter consequens naturam eius intrinsecam. Patet illud ex illo, quia omne esse essenciale prærequitur suum effectum tanquam suum intrinsecum principium, quem, dum de per se est effectum, non est ipsum possibile ab eodem separari. Esse autem extrinsecum, cum sit ipsa re posterior, non repugnat ab ipsa re separari, sed non secundum esse actuale, verum tamen secundum esse intelectualle, et cum omne esse separabile super esse inseparabile fundatur tamquam esse extrinsecum super esse intrinseco. Et <quod> denomination [non] extrinsecam est ipsa re posterior, patet quia prærequirit denominacionem realem intrinsecam se priorem, ergo plane patet, quod sequitur (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 47r).

51 Sicut se habet homo pictus ad verum hominem, ita proposicio ut signum ad realem proposicionem. Probatur, quia proposicio ut signum est accidentis separabile atque signum analogice significans propositionem realem. Igitur sicut se habet homo pictus ad viventem hominem etc., ut patet ex Antepredicamentis Aristotelis (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 47r).
that no sign denotes the truth, or is inseparable from the thing he signifies. The truth or the reality, however, is inseparable and, therefore, no sign is the truth.\footnote{Nullum signum sub racione huiusmodi est denominative verum, [et] quia nullum signum, ut huiusmodi, est esse inseparabile illius, quod significat; sed verum vel veritas sunt huiusmodi, igitur nullum tale signum ut huiusmodi est verum, etc (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 47r).}

Thus in these corollaries, Jerome further elaborates his position that is directed against the signs, although his principal rejection of them will only follow. Nevertheless, already in the preceding text, he particularly develops the addititious component of his system, the expression denominacio. According to Jerome, this denominacio is either internal or external, but the latter is based on the former, and the internal one always precedes the external. If the real proposition “a man” precedes its denomination by means of signs (which is an external denomination), then it seems that the internal denominacio rests in nothing else than in the denomination (within the framework of a real proposition) by means of the universals, which in their role as internal principles (without which the given thing cannot exist) are present in the thing, and it is not possible to separate them from it. The internal denominacio, therefore, derives from the internal nature of the thing.\footnote{According to Kaluža, “La question de Jérôme de Prague,” 150, Jerome’s term denominacio corresponds to the Wyclifite term denominacio universalis.}

Finally, in the last conclusion and its corollaries, Jerome deals with the role of the signs. He admits that there may be some propositional truths in the signs, nevertheless they persist in their primary significata (primarie significatis), because the truth of the sentence “man is an animal” is not in the voice, in the letters or in the primary concept, but in its primary significate (significato primario), that is, in the thing, and the thing is that a man or the human nature of man is an animal.\footnote{Quamvis veritates proposicionales quedam sunt in signis, manent tamen in eorum primarie significata[n]tis. Probatur, nam veritas huius ‘Homo est animal’ non est in voce, scripto aut conceptu primario, sed in <suo> significato primario, id est in re, que res est hominem seu naturam humanam esse animal, igitur conclusio vera (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 47r).}

The truth of the primary significate, according to the first corollary, is in its way the cause of the truth of the sign. Jerome bases this on Aristotle’s statement, according to which is an assertion true or false because a thing is or is not, and Jerome adds that being in the primary sense is the cause of truth, which in its manner is a sign.\footnote{Veritas significatori primarii est [in] causa suomodo veritatis signi. Patet hoc corollarium per Aristotelem in Predicamentis, capitulo de substancia: “Ab eo quod res est vel non est, oracio dicitur vera vel falsa.” Igitur esse in primarium <significacionem> causat veritatem, que suo modo est signum, igitur corollarim verum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, ff. 47r–47v).}

Then in the second corollary, he reject the proposition of terms mutually as a truthful one\footnote{Quamvis predicacio terminorum ad invicem est figura veritatis, tamen non est vera (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 47v).} and, in the third corollary, he arrives at an assertion that a truthful logic is not based on signs, but on things. He defines truthful logic as “a virtue to examine
truths or truth easily by the way of a reasoned consideration", which is based in the same place as its principal topic (propositum), that is, in things. He concludes with a citation from Anselm stating that those who assert that the universals are signs, are not dialecticians but dialectical heretics.

Therefore, in the last conclusion of his Heidelberg quaestio, Jerome, so to say, laid out his cards on the table, and directly and forcefully challenged the "doctores signorum" on their own ground, for which he earned not only a perpetual place in their memory, but also an uncompromising approach (which was noted earlier). He continued to treat the priority of "realist logic," and thus also the original significates of every proposition, which are in the real thing, because the real thing itself is, for Jerome, a proposition. These original significates, in turn, establish as causes the truth of other propositions, including the mutual proposition of terms, so that, for him, the "real" logic cannot be founded elsewhere than in things. With such statements he also embraced the view that defends the objectivity of human knowledge, and thus he accepted a close isomorphism between the external world and the world of the human mind. The linguistic dimension of things, for Jerome, follows the ontological dimension that represents the foundation for human knowledge, which, according to him, is not limited to the concepts and terms of the nominalist approach that does not insert created universals into things.

It is precisely the importance of the real created universals that penetrates the entire quaestio UVGS, which insinuates the question, why Jerome chose to present this position in the University of Heidelberg, which is often designated as one of the hotbeds of nominalism. All parts of his presentation are, in fact, in conflict with nominalism. His concept of ideas conflicts with the definition of nominalism’s leading advocate, William Ockham (even in Jerome’s own eyes). The nominalist standpoint is also contradicted by his

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57 Vera logica non in signis, sed in rebus est fundata. Probatur, nam vera logica, cum sit virtus discursiva facile inquirendi veritates seu veritatem, non in signis, sed in rebus consistit. Patet, quia logica vera tantum ibi est fundata, ubi suum principale propositum est fundatum. Sed hoc est in rebus, ut patet, igitur corollarium verum (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 47v).

58 Non dialectici, sed vere dialectice heretici sunt, qui dicunt universalia esse signa (MS Basel UB VIII A 24, f. 47v).

59 Jerome’s position in the question of logic is remembered by two witnesses in Vienna, Nicholas Tell and Konrad of Hildesheim, see Klicman, Processus iudiciarius, 13, 15. Concerning these witnesses’ memory, see Martin Nodl, “Paměť a intelektuál” [Memory and the Intellectual], in Jiří Kroupa ed., Septuaginta Paulo Spunar oblata (70+2) (Prague, 2000) 376–384.

60 See Jerome’s quaestio, “Utrum sub ente analogo aliqua quiditas universalis sit ponenda extra signa humanitus adinventa et intenciones ad intra (USEA): ... patet, quod respectu realis scienсie rerum universalium oportet dare universalia scibilia, que sunt res reales... Item via Nominalium que non ponit universale ad extra in re, sed dumtaxat terminum vel conceptum, necessario habet dicere consequenter respondendo, quod omnis scienсia humana terminatur objective solum ad terminum vel conceptum; sed hoc notorie falsum – igitur et suum quo se fundat fundamentum” ed. Jan Sedláčk, Studie a texty 2 (1915) 255–256.

concept of created universals as really existing internal principles of created things, which are essentially identical with the universals, but formally distinct from them. Finally, the right logic, according to Jerome, is based on the created universals; it is founded on things, not on signs, as – according to Jerome – the nominalists maintained. On the other hand, all of these propositions were at least in principle in agreement with the realist teaching of Wyclif and his followers (the triple division of being, the essential identity and the formal distinction between the universal and the particular, and the logic, based on real propositions). Therefore, Jerome could hardly expect that his teaching in its totality would fall on fertile ground in Heidelberg. This dissonance, however, explains the length of the disputation that followed Jerome’s presentation, as well as the stormy reaction that his performance aroused.

Now we shall briefly devote ourselves to certain aspects of Jerome’s *quaesitio* in the *quodlibet* of Knín. In the later part of this article, we shall also return to the citation from Anselm.

**Quaestio UAPR from Knín’s Quodlibet**

The international scholarly community is familiar with the details of Jerome’s performance at the *quodlibet* of Knín in 1409, as well as with their antecedents. Let us recall at least that it is happening in the context of the power aspirations of Wenceslaus IV, and that it was preceded in 1408 by considerable pressure against the Prague advocates of Wyclif’s teaching from the archbishop and later the pope, as well as from the party of dissenting masters. Among the unintended results of this pressure was the choice of Master Matĕj Knín (recently accused of heresy) as the leader of the annual disputation. Because of an accusation, submitted to the Roman Curia by Master Ludolf Meistermann, Master Stanislav of Znojmo, a leading member of Hus’s Reform party, was forced to leave Prague to be judged by Cardinal Uggocione. Inasmuch as he is accompanied by another outstanding master, Štěpán of Páleč, their absence had opened up an opportunity for the initiatives of their successors, among whom Jan Hus, Jan Jesenice, and particularly

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Jerome of Prague are the most notable. Jerome was to be one of the most important speakers in Knín’s *quodlibet* and he would outshine to a great extent even the leader of the *quodlibet*, when he delivers – in Knín’s place – the concluding words and the famous oration, “A Praise of the Liberal Arts.”63 The concluding speech, however, was preceded by “the tournament of the knights of erudition,” which included Jerome’s delivery of the *quaestio*, *Utrum a parte rei universalia sit necessarium ponere pro mundi sensibilis harmonia* (UAPR), the subject of our further discussion.64

Jerome divided his presentation into two articles, the first of which was to be devoted to the ideas, the second one to the created universals, on which – according to Jerome – rested the harmony of the sensory perceptible world. Judging from the extant manuscript record, he did not realise the original intention and, instead, inserted the planned content of the second article into the second part of the first article. The second article of the *quaestio* UAPR stands as a valuable proof of at least a fragmentary knowledge (among the Prague Masters) of the translation of Plato’s *Timaeus* by Chalcidius,65 inasmuch as virtually the entire article consists of an implicit citation from this translation.66

The hidden citation from Plato’s *Timaeus* in the second article, however, is not the sole borrowing that Jerome does not explicitly acknowledge in the *quaestio* UAPR, and if we know that *quaestio* USFU and USEA *extraxit de magno quodam volumine, quod aggregavit Parisius, Anglie et in aliis studiis ubi fuit, de materia universalium realium*,67 it seems that the same may be true of *quaestio* UAPR, which was written later than the two previously-mentioned ones,68 and which contains more of these implicit borrowings than Jerome’s own statements.69 Also for this reason, we shall – after briefly


64 For a doctrinal reconstruction of *quaestio* UAPR, see Zénon Kaluža, “Jérôme de Prague et le Timée de Platon,” *AHDLMA* 64 (1991) 57–104.


66 There are the following passages from Timaeus: 28b–29c, 30c–31c a 32c–33b. Chalcidius’s translation was published by Jan H. Waszink (ed.), *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentario instructus* (London and Leiden, 1962).

67 See Jan Sedláčik, “Filosofické spory Pražské v době Husové” [Prague Philosophical Disputes in the Time of Hus], in *Studie a texty* 2 (1915) 211.

68 For the chronology of Jerome’s quaeestiae, see František Šmahel, “Univerzitní kvestie a polemiky,” 7–41 or an updated English version in František Šmahel, ed., *Die Prager Universität Im Mittelalter* 539–580.

69 “Hidden” borrowings were a routine part of not just the *quaestiae* and it is a question of whether can be understood as plagiarism. Authors assumed a knowledge of the cited
noting the contents of the *quaestio* UAPR – select only its conclusions and corollaries, so that afterwards we might direct our attention to one of the extraordinarily interesting *notanda*.

Jerome devotes the first conclusion of the *quaestio* UAPR to the highest ideal universals, and in his philosophical system – just as in the *quaestio* UVGS – he places them outside the created particulars and universals into the divine essence, which, according to him, is necessary for the harmony of the sensory world.\(^{70}\) This proposition he then argues in a triple way,\(^{71}\) and he adds to the conclusion a corollary, in which he states that the total harmony of the sensory perceptible world presupposes a harmony of intelligible things.\(^{72}\)

A *notandum* that follows concerns the analogous being (*ens analogum*), which according to Jerome is the first and most common created thing, which encompasses all others and responds to the question “whether a thing is” (*si est*), only after which a question “what the thing is” (*quid est*) can follow, whereupon the hierarchy of the relations of created things – categories and universals that participate in the analogous being – is described from the top to the bottom.\(^{73}\) This *notandum* of the *quaestio* UAPR, in which Jerome once more stresses the importance of the universals, undoubtedly has Oxfordian foundations.\(^{74}\)

The second *notandum* in which the manner of inherence of accidents in substances is discussed, and which represents a hitherto unidentified borrowing from another author, has the same foundations. This time, however, other than Wyclif. First of all, let us note what Jerome states in it. According to him, ten of the most general genera depend on the analogous being, whereby it is necessary that nine of them inhere in the category of substance, because nine genera of accidents have their foundation in the being of the substance. The inherence is then vested in the substance either in the manner of form, or in
the manner of matter, or as a mixture of both, and moreover every accident inheres either internally \((ab\ intrinseco)\), or externally \((ab\ extrinseco)\), or partly internally and partly externally \((partim\ ab\ intrinseco\ et\ partim\ ab\ extrinseco)\), so that there are altogether nine manners of inherence in the substance, whereby a different accident corresponds to each of them (see Illustration 1). Such an inherence of nine accidents in a substance then is nothing else, but “the most beautiful harmony” and Jerome ends his article with the assertion that the common forms and the quiditative universals must be necessarily presumed for the harmony of the sensory world. He then declares in the corollary that those who say that such individual universals are signs, are not dialecticians, but dialectical heretics, whereby the first article ends. Then there follows the text which was mainly borrowed from Calcidius’ translation of \textit{Timaeus}, as the content of the second article.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{racione forme} & \text{racione materie} & \text{racione mixtionis} \\
\hline
\text{ab intrinseco} & (1) qualitas & (4) quantitas & (7) relacio \\
\text{ab extrinseco} & (2) quandalitas & (5) ubi & (8) habitus \\
\text{partim – partim} & (3) accio & (6) passio & (9) posicio \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Illustration 1}
\end{table}

As mentioned earlier, Jerome’s scheme of categories is borrowed from another author’s text. The candidates are two texts, which contain a differentiation of virtually identical categories to Jerome’s. They are \textit{Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum} of Walter Burley\textsuperscript{77} and \textit{Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis} of Robert Alyngton,\textsuperscript{78} although the possibility of

\textsuperscript{75} The illustration is based on Jerome’s division of accidents and it is merely suggestive; the manuscript of UAPR does not include it. Considering the exhaustion of all possible combinations, we see that Jerome probably deals with the problem of \textit{sufficientia praedicamentorum}, if, according to him, such a differentiation of inherence of accidents in the substance represents “the most beautiful harmony”. More on this below.

\textsuperscript{76} For the second part of the first article of UAPR, see Jan Sedláčk, \textit{Studie a texty} 2 (1915) 219–221, for the sizable citation from \textit{Timaeus}, see ibid., 221–223.

\textsuperscript{77} A transcription was prepared by Allesandro D. Conti [cited 15–1–2009]. Accessible on <http://www-static.cc.univaq.it/diri/lettere/docenti/conti/Allegati/WB_praedicamenta.pdf>.

\textsuperscript{78} A partial edition with an extensive introductory study was prepared by Alessandro D. Conti, “Linguaggio e realtà nel commento alle \textit{Categorie} di Robert Alyngton,” \textit{Documenta et Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale} 4 (1993) 179–306; for a doctrinal interpretation, see idem, “Alyngton’s Interpretation of the \textit{Categories},” in Lloyd A. Newton, ed., \textit{Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s \textit{Categories}} (Leiden, 2008) 317–346. Robert Alyngton was, in 1379–1386, a member of Queens College, where John Wyclif was starting his study of theology. Here, Alyngton received his degree of \textit{magister in artibus} and, in 1393, his doctorate in theology. He served as Chancellor of the University in 1393 and 1395, and as Rector of Long Whatton, Leicestershire, where he died in September 1398. See Alfred Brotherston Emden, A \textit{Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500}, 3 vv. (Oxford, 1957–1959) 1:30–31. For additional biographical data, see Conti, “Alyngton’s Interpretation of the \textit{Categories},” 319 n.6.
another unknown text cannot be ruled out. Considering that Burley expresses himself much more concisely than Jerome, while Jerome’s passage in UAPR is virtually identical with a passage in the chapter *De numero et sufficientia praedicatorum* of the *Litteralis sententia*,79 it seems that Jerome’s description is closer to Alyngton’s. The remaining question is the ultimate source of this division of categories. Alyngton states that it has been customary, from ancient times, to classify the sufficiency of categories in this manner.80 At the same time, neither Burley considers such division his own, and refers to *aliqui*, who say that “*predicamentum sumitur a modo predicandi et modus predicandi a modo essendi.*”81 Hence Alyngton does not necessarily refer to Burley, but to *aliqui*, to whom Burley also refers and maybe has in mind certain representatives of so-called modists, the speculative grammarians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Jerome probably does not refer directly to them, but – aside from considerable coincidences with Alyngton – he uses in his *quaestio*, instead of the name of *quando* for one of the accidents, the term *quandalitas*, which is of Wyclifite origin and is used by Alyngton.82 Thus, for these reasons, the bottom line is that he evidently adopted the passage in question from Alyngton.

It is not clear, how this borrowing influenced Jerome’s doctrine, because from the earlier-mentioned conclusion it appears that the purpose of his description of the inherence of accidents in the substance was above all to show “the most beautiful harmony,” and thus evidently, just like Burley, he wished to illustrate the completeness of Aristotle’s list of categories, and to show the relationship of the categories to being.83 Together with a number of other medieval authors, Jerome expressed himself on the question of *sufficientia praedicamentorum* and accepted its traditional solution in agreement with Aristotle.84

This probable borrowing from Alyngton, one of the most significant continuators of Wyclif, points to a likely influence of Jerome’s studies at Oxford.

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79 See Conti, “*Linguaggio e realtà nel commento alle Categorie* di Robert Alyngton,” 252 l. 49–253 l. 86.
80 “*Quo ad secundum solet sufficientia istorum praedicamentorum ab antiquis conici per hunc modum,*” ibid., 252 l. 49–50.
81 See the transcript of the text, 25.
84 Among the Bohemian masters, this question was treated in an interesting way by Stanislav of Znojmo (*De universalibus maiori*, 131–138) yet even he accepts the traditional ten categories and opposes any other view.
on his writings, because in England he encountered the still lively doctrine of the so-called Oxford realists. The two principle signs of the later Oxford realists, which they had adopted from Wyclif, namely, the utilisation of essential identity and formal distinction, and the advocacy of logic “in rebus”, can also be found in Jerome’s teaching. Thus – next to Jerome’s Bohemian mentors and John Wyclif – they might have constituted his additional important sources.

The Diabolical Heretics

At the end of the second article of UVGS, as well as at the end of the first article of UAPR, Jerome does not hesitate to use the citation from St. Anselm’s treatise, De incarnatione Verbi against the opponents of real universals, and to call them dialectical heretics which was, according to Damasus Trapp, nothing unusual among the realists and, instead of the designation of “nominalists,” for a long time precisely the citation about the “dialectical heretics” was used. At the beginning of this article, it was already noted that – according to some sources – the Bohemian realists adjusted the quotation and called their opponents “diabolical heretics,” and so, too, Jerome on many occasions. Let us next examine individual sources containing this expression, and try to decide whether Jerome actually used this altered form.

Most of the material for our examination is supplied by Jerome’s performance in Heidelberg, as the incriminating expression is recorded in two university books and in two manuscripts containing quaestio UVGS; moreover the expression – as well as Anselm’s statement in particular – is remembered by Nicholas Tell, a witness at Jerome’s Vienna trial. In addition, the expression appears in Jerome’s quaestio UAPR, and in the polemic of an unknown master against some of Jerome’s Prague presentations. The editions of the two sources from Heidelberg – the Rectors books and the Acts of the Arts

85 Jerome could familiarise himself with the teaching of the Oxford realists also in Prague where some of the texts of the Oxford realists were available. The cited text of Alynston is preserved in MS Prague NK ČR V B 11, ff. 1r–105r, the passage about the inherence of accidents on ff. 10r–10v. On the other hand, however, the manuscript belonged to the library of Šimon of Chrudim, who taught at the University of Prague many years after Jerome’s death. Among other posts, Šimon served as dean of the Faculty of Arts in 1464 and 1476. See Pavel Spunar, “Literární činnost utrakvistů doby poděbradské a jagellonské,” in Amedeo Molnár, ed., Příspěvky k dějinám utrakvismu [Contributions to the History of Utraquism] ARBI 1 (Praha, 1978) 217–218.


87 The variant of the citation with “diabolical heretics” is not found either in the edition of F. Schmitt, or in the Patrologia Latina. Similarily, it is not found in two other Prague manuscripts which contain Anselms’ treatise De Incarnatione Verbi (MS Prague KNM XII A 6 and MS Prague KNM XIII B 3).
Faculty—agree that Jerome correctly cited from Anselm, and there is not a trace of “diabolical heretics.” On the contrary, the edition of UVGS has Jerome maintaining that “non diabolici, sed vere diabolice haeretici sunt, qui dicunt universalia esse signa,” and similarly in the edition of the quaestio UAPR: “Non dyaletici sed dyabolice heretici sunt, qui dicunt singula universalia tantummodo esse signa.” Likewise the unknown master, who opposed some of Jerome’s presentations, according to the edition used Jerome’s linkage “non sunt dyaletici sed dyabolice heretici.” Finally, in the edited protocol of the Vienna trial, there is the testimony of the earlier-mentioned Tell that Jerome “intulerit magistros Okkan, Maulveld, Biridanum, Marsilium et eorum sequaces fuisse non dialecticos, sed diabolice hereticos.”

The situation therefore is confusing, with one set of documents confirming Jerome’s modification of Anselm’s statement, the other to the contrary showing that there was no modification. Hence it is necessary to re-examine the medieval manuscripts and attempt a fresh interpretation.

The only manuscript, which is entirely clear and legible, is Paris lat. 1508, where on f. 20v we find precisely what is in edition of quaestio UVGS and, moreover, in a fully written form without abbreviations. On the other hand, the copy is unreliable, because it has been shown that the copyist and the corrector did not understand the text and introduced a number of nonsensical changes. Therefore, it cannot be considered relevant for our search. Additional manuscripts, however, do not offer a solution either. Although in the second manuscript of the quaestio UVGS Basel UB A VIII 24 f. 47v the expression in question appears twice, the key words are in both cases abbreviated as dyaci and dyace and it is not possible to unambiguously determine, how to expand the abbreviations. Moreover, the scribe of the polemic against Jerome abbreviates in almost the same way in MS Prague NK ČR VIII E 5, f. 181v (dyaci and dyace). Another piece of evidence is MS Prague NK ČR X E 24 with quaestio UAPR, where on f. 252v we find the expression partially abbreviated as non dyaletici, sed dyace heretici. A similar case is the manuscript Ottobonianus latinus 348 from the Vatican Apostolic Library containing the protocol of the Vienna trial, which on f. 265v offers the read-

88 Miethke, ed., Die Rektorbücher 414; and Hautz, Geschichte, 232.
89 Editions of UVGS, 160; of UAPR, 221.
90 See Sedlák, Studie a texty 2 (1915) 228.
91 See Klicman, Processus iudiciarius 13. The least known of the listed nominalist authors is obviously Johann Maulevelt, an adherent of William Ockham among others, in the reduction of the number of categories. In the light of Jerome’s view concerning the inherence of accidents in the substance in UAPR, it is relevant to note that Maulevelt in his commentary on the categories questioned the existence of precisely the category of substance. See Robert Andrews, “Thomas Maulevelt’s Denial of Substance,” in Lloyd A. Newton ed., Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories (Leiden, 2008) 347–368, which contains additional literature on his life and teaching.
93 I am grateful to Professor František Šmahel for lending me a copy of this manuscript.
ing *non dialeticos sed diaele hereticos*. Finally, the Heidelberg manuscripts do not help to clarify the issue either. In the Rectors’ Book, MS Heidelberg UA RA 653 we read on f. 91 “*non loycos sed vere diaele hereticos*” and similarly in the Acts of the Arts Faculty, MS Heidelberg UA H IV 101/1 f. 28r: “*Non loyce auctores sed vere dyaele hereticos*.”

From what has been said, it appears clearly that the scribes of the manuscripts, in which both words are abbreviated in the same way, wished to abbreviate the same word. Furthermore, we can suppose that in most other manuscripts the scribe wrote out the first word in full and, therefore, could abbreviate the second one. On this basis, we could refute that Jerome modified Anselm’s expression for his own purposes and spoke about diabolical heretics. Nevertheless, we can dispel the last shadow of doubt by turning to two more manuscripts in order to further clarify the matter, since it has been claimed that the alleged statement about the diabolical heretics was used not only by Jerome but also by his esteemed teacher Stanislav of Znojmo as well as by Mikuláš Biceps.

The MS Prague Bib. Cap. C 19, which contains the *Commentary on the Sentences* of Biceps, on f. 13r refers to the venerable Anselm and to his words, and, according to Sedlák we read here “*quos venerabilis Anshelmus vocat dyabolice hereticos.*” This reading of the manuscript, however, is questionable, because we encounter the abbreviation *dyalece*, which does not offer the possibility of reading as *dyabolice*. The evidently final answer to our quest is supplied by the shorter treatise *De universalibus* of Stanislav of Znojmo, which is extant in three manuscripts. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to refer to MS Prague NK VIII E 11, which Sedlák used for his edition. Although Sedlák prints “*dyaletici ymmo dyabolice heretici,*” in the manuscript on f. 209r we actually find the cited text written out as “*dyaletici immo dyatetice heretici*” without any abbreviation. In other words, this is not the alleged expression of the Prague realists, but the actual expression of Anselm, as we know it from his writings. The alleged modification of Anselm’s text in the writings of Bohemian medieval realists is, therefore, shown to be a paleographical error, which can be disregarded.

On the other hand, however, we have noted that Anselm and his treatise *De Incarnatione Verbi* were actually popular among the Prague scholars. In fact, even Jan Hus, prior to his execution in Constance, had appealed to Anselm in the matter of the real universals, although it is not known to which specific text. As for Jerome, he undoubtedly used the sobriquet of “dialecti-

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94 See Sedlák, *Studie a texty* 2 (1915) 198 n.3.
96 For a survey of some of the manuscripts with Anselm’s works in Prague, see Vilém Herold, “Prag als Ort der Mittelalterforschung – Anselm von Canterbury und Prague,” in Vilém Herold and Josef Zumr, eds., *The Europaean Dimension of St. Anselm’s Thinking* (Prague, 1993) 11–22.
97 See FRB VIII, 75.
cal heretics” quite routinely, and this was sufficiently provocative, even if he did not speak about diabolical heretics, as the stormy reaction of audiences—which held contrary views—shows. It would seem, therefore, that he never called his opponents “diabolical heretics,” unless he was one of the glossators of manuscripts, containing Wyclif’s treatise, *De veritate sacrae Scripturae*, or let himself be inspired by one of the glossators.

In fact, even Wyclif in *De veritate sacrae Scripturae* calls attention to Anselm’s statement “*quod negantes talia universalia sunt dialectice heretici.*” He does so in an extraordinarily interesting philosophical passage, describing the quintuple armament (*quintuplex armatura*), by which the truth of the Holy Scripture can be defended.98 Moreover, our “diabolical heretics” actually figure in some of the fourteen manuscript witnesses to Wyclif’s treatise. These manuscripts are deposited in England, Oxford Bodleian Library Bodl. 924 p. 58, and Cambridge Queens Coll. 27 ff. 24v and 25r, in which (in the form of marginal glosses) we find altogether three notations that add to the citation the expression of either *diabolici* or *diabolice.*99 The most interesting note, “*nota quod negantes universalia talia sunt diabolici heretici secundum Anselmum*” appears in the Oxford manuscript, which has numerous glosses by at least seven different hands, indicating that the manuscript was read frequently.100

It is known that Jerome, after obtaining the B.A. degree in Prague in 1398, went to Oxford above all to obtain Wyclif’s theological writings for his Czech teachers,101 and thus it cannot be excluded that he might have encountered the manuscript during his studies in Oxford, and that he might have been inspired by it, or even written some of the glosses, inasmuch as the manuscript dates before 1400.102 At present, this cannot be confirmed. It appears likely, however, that there existed a certain tradition that modified Anselm’s statement as we know it from the edition of the texts of certain Prague Masters, albeit in those texts the modification resulted from errors of transcription.

Translated from the Czech by Zdeněk V. David.

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99 On the preservation of the manuscripts, see Harrison J. Thomson, “Unnoticed Manuscripts of Wyclif’s *De veritate Sacre Scripture*,” *Medium aevum* 12 (1943) 68–70; and Williell R. Thomson, *The Latin Writings of John Wycliff* (Toronto, 1983) 55–57. Among manuscripts which might shed further light on the problem at hand, I have been unable to consult: MS Cambridge, Peterhouse Coll. 223. The other manuscripts are faithful to Anselm. For their kind help in searching out the relevant folia, I am indebted to librarians of the Bodleian Library in Oxford, especially Patricia Buckingham and also to the librarians of Queens’ College, Cambridge, especially Karen Begg and Andrew Zurcher.

100 See Wyclif, *De veritate sacrae Scripturae*, 1:lvi–lxx.

101 See, for exemple, František Šmahel, *Die Hussitische Revolution* (Hanover, 2002) 1:790.